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ABSTRACT This case study deals with the conditions and impacts of the 
implementation of Law CXXIV (2012) which has radically changed the regulation 
that applies to the Hungarian market for tobacco products. 
The new regulation promised to provide significant political benefits for the ruling 
coalition because the majority of the population support the proposition that 
smoking by the young generation should be prevented. This is the reason why the 
Hungarian government and the national assembly played a significant role in the 
remarkable modification of the regulation of this market. Another important factor 
in this development was that one of the decisive market players – by mobilizing 
its political influence and connections – was involved in the legislative process 
from its very beginning. The efforts of candidates close to power (who wanted to 
enter this market) were not coordinated, but these players expected to receive good 
support from decision makers. But the new regulation was subject to a number 
of flaws and demonstrations. As a result of the new legislation there remained 
1500 settlements without a shop for tobacco sales. This unexpected development 
and the high and growing number of loss-making tobacco shops forced the 
government (and the state company responsible for the tobacco market) to modify 
permanently the regulation after only a short period of time. The main reason for 
the disturbances in the market was the administrative restructuring of the market 
for tobacco products. 
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The aim of this paper is to reconstruct a regulatory story.2 How did the 
development the implementation and adaptation of “Law CXXIV (2012) on 
the suppression of smoking among youth and on the retail trade of tobacco 
products” happen? What were the effects of the adoption of the law on the 
Hungarian market for tobacco products? Why did repeatedly re-regulating 
this disturbed market become unavoidable? The story has not concluded, so - 
somewhat arbitrarily – we conclude the description and analysis of the story 
in the weeks following the national election in spring 2014.
DEFINITION
The scope of market regulation defines all the rules and prescriptions which 
are accepted by the market players voluntarily, or due to the constraints of 
the state and which somehow influence their costs and benefits.  In this 
article we shall only tangentially deal with cases of regulation created by 
voluntary associations or which are accepted by coalitions of entrepreneurs. 
Our subject area will be narrower: we shall deal with the impacts of state 
regulation.3 Therefore we shall accept and use the conventional definition 
used in the economic literature, whereby regulation is described as the mutual 
relationship between the state and the regulated.4 
State regulation can take several forms:
– Public statutes, standards or statements of expectations.
–  A process of registration or licensing for the approval and permitting of 
the operation of a service, usually by a named organization or person.
–  A process of inspecting, or other form of ensuring standard compliance, 
including reporting and management of non-compliance with standards: 
In cases where there is ongoing non-compliance, then…
2  This article  is one of the outputs of a research project named “The unexpected consequences 
and impacts of the regulation of markets” which was financed by the Hungarian Scientific 
Research Fund (OTKA) 
3  A regulated market or controlled market is a market where the government controls the forces 
of supply and demand, such as who is allowed to enter the market or what prices may be 
charged. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regulatory_economics
4  According to the Chicagoans, “government” is simply a supplier of regulatory services such 
as price fixing, restriction of entry, subsidies, suppression of substitutes, and promotion of 
complementary goods. In exchange for these highly valuable services, the regulated industry 
can offer legislators campaign contributions, speaking honoraria, and the votes of industry 
employees and can promise highly remunerative future employment to regulators.  Mitchell 
–Munger (1991) 514. pp.
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–  A process of de-licensing whereby the organization or person concerned 
is judged to be operating unsafely, and is ordered to stop operating or 
suffer a penalty for acting unlawfully.5
One part of this defined set of rules was consciously designed to influence 
the market conditions of the regulated. There is another subset which consists 
of rules and prescriptions, the purpose of which is different, yet still influences 
the market conditions of the regulated. But the outcome is similar: these rules 
modify the costs and benefits of market players. There are no un-regulated 
markets. We cannot speak about ‘unregulated’ statuses in the case of brand 
new products and services either because the current operating rules apply to 
evolving markets as well.
Through our recent research we distinguish between designed (and within 
this category ‘declared’ and ‘hidden’) and actual (‘expected’ and ‘unexpected’) 
impacts. The regulatory institutions6 involved in the modification of the law 
explained to the regulated and to the interested public in some way (as part 
of the new rules, or in a related commentary) why they created new rules 
or modified the old ones. These statements consist of declarations about the 
aims of the regulation. Based on other statements, interviews, and by using 
the method of comparative text-analysis we can reconstruct the hidden (by the 
community or by the affected) and unrecognized (or only later recognized) 
purposes of the new or modified regulation. In this article we focus on 
clarifying the unexpected events and processes that took place. Careful 
description and evaluation of these phenomena may help to explain and to 
analyze “regulatory illusions” and “regulatory anger.”7 
Players in the tobacco market before the 2012 Act
We assume that our chances of successfully evaluating and describing 
the unexpected developments in the markets for products or services are 
better than average as the radical (and the majority of) stakeholder-affecting 
changes took place recently. Unaware of the unusual developments to follow, 
we chose the market for tobacco products as the target of our research project 
in the autumn of 2012. 
5 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regulatory_economics
6 Namely, the state, voluntary associations, or ad hoc coalitions of entrepreneurs
7 These expressions have regularly been used by Hungarian economists over the last few years.
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The reasons for our choice were, among others:
–  that the opportunity for substituting these products is limited, therefore 
the boundaries of the tobacco market would be clearly designated,
–  that the turnover of tobacco products is significant and accounts for a 
growing share of Hungarian retail traffic8, and
– that the entire production chain is located in Hungary. 
Just briefly: a few hundred producers planted tobacco on 6366 hectares of 
land while a total of 10,923 tons of tobacco were grown in Hungary in 2013. In 
the first years following the post-socialist transition there were four privately-
owned tobacco producing companies in Hungary. Before the transition there 
were four state-owned tobacco factories in Hungary.9 These companies did 
not engage in independent marketing activities and all of them produced 
similar, popular cigarette brands. The retail trade of tobacco products was 
managed by the state-owned wholesaler company Hungarotabak.
Privatization of these companies started in 1992. The biggest tobacco 
producer in the country became the foreign-owned British America Tobacco 
Company Hungary.10 Continental Dohányipari Csoport (The Continental 
Tobacco Group), meanwhile is a family-owned private company which 
unified many European tobacco companies. Continental has more than 500 
employees in Hungary. Phillip Morris Hungary was established in 1992 when 
Phillip Morris bought the Tobacco Factory in Eger. After privatization by 
sale the manufacture of tobacco products ceased at Eger and Phillip Morris 
Tobacco Trading Company Hungary started to sell and distribute the tobacco 
products of foreign partners.11 The Debrecen Tobacco Factory, privatized 
by the Reemtsma Cigarettenfabriken GmbH in 1992, is no longer actively 
producing. Ten years later the ownership of the company changed: The 
United Kingdom-based Imperial Tobacco (IT) announced the acquisition 
of the factory on 15th of May 2002. Two years after this event, IT stopped 
production at its factories in Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia but continued 
to sell its products through its subsidiaries in Hungary.12 Because only some 
of the tobacco products of the manufacturers are distributed either directly 
8 Based on estimations the yearly turnover of these products is about 500-550 billion HUF.
9 In the towns of Debrecen, Pécs, Eger and Sátoraljaújhely
10  Previously, Pécsi Dohánygyár The number employed nowadays is about 800. http://www.
dbmsz.hu/companies.php*
11 http://www.pmi.com/hun/pages/homepage.aspx
12 http://www.imptob.hu/index.php?topic_id=15
43RESTRUCTURING AND RE-REGULATION OF THE HUNGARIAN TOBACCO MARKET
CORVINUS JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL POLICY  2 (2015) 
or through subsidiaries in the retail trade, the 24-25 tobacco wholesalers are 
important players in the market too. 
Before the implementation of Law CXXIV (2012), tobacco products were 
transported from the factories of wholesalers to 40-42 thousand retail outlets. 
In this period – it is estimated – “about 80 percent of tobacco products were 
sold in food shops, and a few percent in cigar-stores, gas stations and through 
the dedicated tobacco shops of smaller supermarkets. The remaining trade 
was managed by the hypermarkets of multinational companies. (Tesco, Cora 
and others)”.13 A significant number of these retail outlets and small shops 
were not managed directly by the owners but were units of small privately-
owned chains. In other cases, the owner, the manager of the shop and the 
license holder were different people.  
Why the bill was submitted at all, and why in 2012?
The entry into force (or postponement, and perhaps prevention of 
amendments and extensions; in other words, the timing of market regulation) 
says a lot about the plans, intentions and tactics of the legislators and of those 
social-economic groups and organizations who wanted to influence them. 
In this case legislative activity was not justified by the existence of a 
regulatory deficit. “The bill on the reduction of smoking among youth and 
on the retail sale of tobacco products” (hereafter ‘the tobacconist law’) was 
adopted by the Hungarian parliament on 11th of September 2012. Little 
known is that less than a year before the submission and adoption of this law, 
the Hungarian parliament had already re-regulated in detail the market for 
tobacco products. Namely, in the form of XLI law of 2011, amending XLII 
(1999) “on the protection of non-smokers and on some questions concerning 
the consumption and trade of tobacco products” was adopted in May of 2011 
and entered into force in January of 2012. This law tightened up and added 
further specified the provisions of the regulation. We have no information 
about its effects. 
Pro-government MPs – based on survey made more than a year earlier 
– mentioned the inefficiency of the regulations (including the previously-
mentioned law of May of 2011) only a few months later in the parliamentary 
debate about the tobaccon ist law of 2012: “The figures about young people’s 
access to tobacco products show clearly that the current legislation does 
not meet the interests of young people because only every second retailer is 
13 http://hvg.hu/gazdasag/20111219_Dohany_Takacs_Zsuzsa_Lazar_Janos 
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protecting them from the effects of tobacco consumption. The current system 
of control and fines does not accord with the intentions of the legislature. 
Shop assistants are not adequately interested in protecting youth.”14
Redressing market disruption was not among the purposes of the change in 
the regulation, in this case because Hungarian consumers were allowed to buy 
tobacco products without any difficulty in the decades before the tobacconist 
law was adopted. 
The most frequently-mentioned reason for implementing the law – alongside 
the declared aim - was to fight the harmful effects of smoking. Government and 
opposition parties argued with each other about the importance of introducing 
anti-smoking regulation.  As to the preamble of the law, the declared aim is 
“that fewer young people would smoke. The first step in achieving this public 
health priority is to limit the extensive availability and presence of tobacco 
products.”15
Some disappointing data justify the unremitting fight against smoking, but 
compared to European standards Hungarian data about smokers are not radical 
outliers and do not indicate the presence of any unexpected, negative changes. 
Using the frequency of the smokers as an indicator for comparison, Hungary 
is located in the middle of the range for all European countries. According 
to some research made in 2012, there were no dramatic changes; moreover, 
some indicators show partial improvements in the situation regarding 
smoking. “The number of male smokers has decreased permanently since 
2000 in Hungary but the ratio practically remained the same among women. 
Compared to 2009, a 2 percent decline occurred in 2012 in the group of less 
than 65 y
ear old males. Among females the share of smokers increased by 1 percent 
in the same period.”16 These data show that changes in smoking habits are 
not enough to explain why Hungarians required a new law to reduce smoking 
among the youth.
Among the other reasons given for implementing the law, it was often 
mentioned that it was: 
– a contribution to improving the effectiveness of the levy system, 
14 http://www.parlament.hu/internet/plsql/ogy_naplo.naplo_fadat?p_ckl=39&p_uln=157&p_
felsz=152&p_szoveg=&p_felszig=152 (speech of Dr. Tamás Heintz, MP, in parliament)
15  2012.évi CXXXIV. törvény a fiatalkorúak dohányzásának visszaszorításáról és a 
dohánytermékek kiskereskedelméről
16  http://www.webbeteg.hu/cikkek/szenvedelybetegseg/13692/felmeres-a-magyar-lakossag-
dohanyzasi-szokasairol illetve http://www.oefi.hu/dohanyzas_tarsadalmi_terhe_OEFI_2012.
pdf
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– a (conscious, or unplanned?) test of a method of nationalization,
– an efficient way of building clientele; moreover,
– it modified the market shares of big producers and distributor companies.
We examine and re-think these assumptions in the following chapters.
Where was the bill prepared (and who prepared it)? 
One important element of the story involves the revelation that, at a meeting 
of the Parliamentary Committee for Consumer Protection on 19 December 
2011, the under-secretary at the Ministry for National Economy reported 
that the bill was not prepared by Ministry staff: “the bill was submitted on 
Friday evening, therefore development of the government’s position has not 
happened yet. We may however indicate that we – the Ministry – agree with 
the aims of the submitter.  We would like to coordinate the legal conditions 
even during the day.”17
So, who prepared the law if not the competent ministry? Who helped 
members of the parliament to create this bill as an independent filing? There 
was not a word mentioned about this issue during the general and detailed 
discussion of the bill. But a few days after the detailed discussion of the bill, 
opposition MPs noticed that the name János Sánta, the owner-manager of 
Continental Tobacco Company and the president of the Hungarian Association 
of Investors at the Tobacco Industry was contained on the data identifier of 
the file containing the proposal which was sent to Brussels.
Based on this information, Katalin Ertsey MP stated in her speech on 28th of 
February 2012 that “the tobacco lobbyist18 participated from the beginning in 
the creation of the tobacconist law, the main purpose of which was to create 
a favorable position for his company on the market.”19 Moreover: “Mr. Sánta 
not only monitors carefully what minister János Lázár20 wrote into the bill but 
he himself formulates the law for the industry which unfolds with a tragicomic 
turn when the text is sent for comment to the European Commission.”21
17  http://www.parlament.hu/biz39/bizjkv39/FVB/1112191.pdf  (post of  deputy undersecretary 
László Szöllősi)
18 János Sánta
19  http://ertseykatalin.blog.hu/2012/02/28/a_dohanylobbi_diktalja_a_trafiktorvenyt_napirend_
elotti_felszolalasom
20 One of the presenters of the bill.
21 ibid
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Secretary of State Miklós Szócska in his response negated, but did not deny, 
the statements made by Ernyei: “This (the adoption of the law) was a step 
which will defend the lives of several thousand people, several thousand 
young ones. Talk about this, please and do not state anything that is not true. 
Or if it is true, make a complaint. Or take the necessary steps which relate to 
the work of a member of parliament.”22 
Minister Lázár János acknowledged that the tobacco owner-manager is an 
old friend, the opinion of whom he solicited about this issue. “I have known 
Mr. Sánta for ten years and I asked his opinion.” “Lázár emphasized that he 
requested an opinion from English and American-owned firms too, but these 
companies did not support the draft. They argued that it would harm their 
interests.”23
The most important changes in market regulation defined in the 
law
The most important changes in market regulation as defined in the law are 
the following:
– nationalization of the tobacco retail trade24
– limit to the range of products available for sale in tobacco shops
–  limit to the number of market players and regulation of their spatial 
distribution
– identification of the potential range of consumers 
– establishment of the Non-Profit National Tobacco Trading Company
The tobacconist law decrees the nationalization of the tobacco retail 
trade: “The retail trade of tobacco product is an activity within the exclusive 
competence of the state, the exercise of which the state may assign to others 
for a specified period under a concession contract which is in accordance 
with the provisions of the Law XIV 1991.” Decisions or orders about such 
activities as concerns the operating licenses of tobacco dealers or in the 
business registrations of limited partnerships or of limited liability companies 
are no longer valid because the state withdraws these rights and permissions 
from them. Namely, “the retail trade of tobacco products can be carried out 
22 http://hvg.hu/itthon/20120227_lazar_dohanylobbi
23 ibid.
24  Part of Law CXXIV (2012) (there was no English language version of the rules so the text 
was translated by the author)
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solely on the basis of a concession contract and by those in possession of an 
authorized license for tobacco trading.”25
The new law regulates the range of products which can be sold in stores. 
“A tobacco shop is a non-mobile, separate, stand-alone retail space which 
only sells tobacco products or specified additional tobacco products, or other 
products according to the legislation.” 
Moreover it regulates the number and the spatial distribution of market 
players: “the tender has to be issued that in settlements where the permanent 
population does not exceed two thousand people, a maximum of one person is 
entitled to sell tobacco products. If the population is more than two thousand 
people, one more seller is permitted and for each additional two thousand 
residents one further person is entitled to sell tobacco products within the 
settlement. If there is more than one tobacco shop in a settlement, a person 
cannot own more than two-thirds of it.”26
The new law specifies the range of potential customers as well: “we must 
always strive to ensure that the sale of tobacco products to young people 
should be forbidden and tobacco products should not be available to them.”27 
There is an important way in which the law did not change compared to the 
former regulation: tobacco production and wholesale were not nationalized; 
the companies involved remained in private hands. 
5. Adoption of the law and founding of the Non-Profit National 
Tobacco Trading Company
The Hungarian Parliament passed the bill with a large majority on 11th 
of September 2012. In October 2012, a few days after the final vote, the 
government - following the requirements of the law - founded the National 
Tobacco Non-profit Trade Company with a 100 percent share for the state. 
The company only a few weeks after being founded launched the first 
tobacco retail shop concession tender. The main aim of the tender was that “in 
opposition to the existing 43 to 44 thousand sales outlets, in the new system 
there will be significantly below 10 thousand tobacco shops.”28
25 Part of Law CXXIV (2012)
26 Part of Law CXXIV (2012)
27 Part of Law CXXIV (2012) (translated by the author)
28 http://www.fidesz.hu/index.php?Cikk=185383 
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Based on political statements, parliamentary dialogue and other comments 
we may reconstruct the list of indicators for the success of the tender. The 
most frequently-mentioned criteria for success were the following:  The 
tender would be deemed a success if… 
–  the number of applicants greatly exceeds the number of concessions for 
tobacco products,
–  the distribution of concessions does not cause any disruption of supply
–  the tender does not lead to price increases, a deterioration in quality, or a 
remarkable increase in consumer effort
–  the tender does not increase the size of the black economy 
–  the tender does not generate differences in profitability among the market 
players
Business plans 
But how was the suitability of those who were interested in the tender 
evaluated? A significant number of our interview partners assumed that large 
grocery stores, gas stations and hypermarkets - which are responsible for the 
major part of the tobacco trade – would be unable to separate the marketing of 
tobacco products, as required by new law. Therefore these market agents would 
not get, nor even ask for, a sales concession. These expectations increased the 
entrepreneurial inclination of other people. “We expected that if few were 
involved in tobacco marketing we would double our previous tobacco sales. 
We prepared a business plan on this basis – and it was a realistic option. For 
example, next to us there were eight places within some few hundreds of 
meters radius where you were able to buy tobacco products before the new 
regulation. We prepared our business plan based on these calculations.”29
But it was difficult to estimate the extent of the market niche which would 
be generated by the change in regulation. One of the tobacconists weighed 
the chances of the company this way: “There are a lot of uncertainties. We 
don’t know whether the dealers will raise the price gap or not. How much of 
an increase in traffic will be associated with the fact that the cigarette boxes 
disappear from shop shelves? If I calculate that there are about a thousand 
places in Pécs where people may buy tobacco products at the moment, and 
from the summer there will be not more than eighty, then my profit may be up 
29 part of an interview
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to 10 times as great as now. But what can I do if it is only 2-3 times more?”30
Another source of uncertainty in these cases was that the expected 
business behavior of the big chain hypermarkets and petroleum stations was 
significantly determined by the share of tobacco products in their portfolio. 
When tobacco products were not significant contributors to turnover, the 
management calculated that total turnover and staff would be reduced to a 
lesser extent. The majority of respondents to a survey were pessimistic. “The 
vast majority of retail dealers (81.1%) forecast a decline in turnover due to 
changes in control and regulation. The new regulation would be fatal in 15.3 
percent of cases. These shops should be closed because the loss of tobacco 
from their sales offerings may cause a dramatic decline in their overall 
traffic.”31Developments like this diminish entrepreneurial inclination.
Moreover, it was the common experience of applicants and those interested 
that smaller settlements were unable to maintain stores which were specialized 
in only a narrow range of products. According to the business plans and 
estimations of those who wanted to locate their businesses in big towns, 
“there is fantasy and money in tobacco shop operations but operating at 
least four to five units is the minimal condition for profitably operating. Real 
benefits can come to those who have ownership of more than this number, but 
such a network is manageable by strawmen only.”32 Such calculations also 
diminished the number of applicants.
At the time our research finished, the list of applicants was not yet public 
therefore we used indirect methods to figure out who participated in the tender 
with such conditions, and why. We supposed that the applicants calculated 
that their income and savings would cover the costs of the business and they 
would generate a reasonable profit. 
The business plan should include the direct costs of submitting the 
application, the costs of implementation and the operation of cash registers 
which are required to be connected to National Non-profit Tobacco Trade Ltd., 
and, of course, the concession fee. The costs of starting a business (property 
acquisition, rent or purchase of equipment or real estate, inventory) were the 
real determinants of applicants’ intentions and level of interest. Popular media 
often quoted an estimation that “at least 5-6 million HUF monthly turnover 
30 part of an interview
31  http://sw.marketingszoftverek.hu/newsletter/letter/c10678/uploads/Fustolgok_Tarsasaga_
flmeres_2011_9december.pdf
32  http://mno.hu/magyar_nemzet_belfoldi_hirei/a-tortenelmi-mult-miatt-puhulhat-a-
trafiktorveny-1120065
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is needed for a tobacco shopkeeper to maintain him/herself.”33 According to 
another estimate, “the start-up investment plus the initial stock for a tobacco 
shop may reach 5 million forints.”34
No matter how thorough these calculations were, applicants did not decide 
based on these alone. Applicants had different business backgrounds, and 
therefore estimated different costs profits and pay-offs.  
The owners of convenience stores and traditional tobacco shops compared 
potential total turnover to that which they were due to lose. Before the law 
came into force in 2012, these shops offered newspapers, candy and lottery 
ticket to potential buyers in addition to tobacco. In several cases these 
businesses were shocked by the loss of their tobacco products sales but they 
counterbalanced their declining market position successfully by improving or 
expanding the shop’s range of supply.
We witnessed similar considerations when an entrepreneur owned other 
shops in addition to the tobacco concession, such as a pub, café, shops or 
productive plants. One of our interview partners was not only an owner-
operator of one of the pubs in a village but also managed a boiler repair 
shop and occasionally engaged in the production of clothing. The adverse 
consequence of the new regulation meant that this person could no longer sell 
tobacco products in his pub, and as a result his lottery traffic also declined. 
The concession owner was required to consider – as were others in such cases 
- how to offset their losses in terms of revenue.
Those who regarded the concession as a marketable product for sale 
calculated in a totally different way. “He said that in the eyes of K. that he was 
aware of the fact that K. was not among the winners of a concession tender 
- which is one of the basic conditions for starting a tobacco shop.  However, 
he himself was among the winners. And it would involve bidding: he would 
be ready to rent the shop. If the family was interested in it he would employ 
one of them.”35
There was yet another group of applicants and those interested in the tender. 
These people wanted to open a national tobacco shop (or shops) but did not 
directly submit an application. Front men - who could raise the investment 
costs and fit such businesses into their portfolios – were the real entrepreneurs. 
These stooges - because of the nature of things – covered for the real investors 
in a majority of cases.  A few such undertakings were discovered and 
33 http://hvg.hu/gazdasag/20130104_csodtol_tartanak_a_trafikosok#
34  http://index.hu/gazdasag/magyar/2013/02/23/a_kistelepuleseken_mozgo_arustol_vehetnek_
cigit_az_emberek/
35 From part of an interview
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documented by the media which show that some (we don’t know how many) 
of the concessions landed in the hands of such business people. “He knew 
months before that the concessions belonged to him and he distributed them 
among the employees of his company. He offered them ridiculous amounts of 
money to use their names. The specificity of the case was that he - to avoid 
attracting attention - signed over a part of his work force as early as January to 
6-8 phantom companies. The majority of these employees are working in one 
shared office but they are formally employed by other companies.”36
Another group of applicants included those who were/are business 
partners, employees and/or sub-contractors of the tobacco producer or trading 
companies. For example, the owners of the earlier-mentioned Continental 
company “stood by the law publicly and declared support and recommended 
everybody – including their employees and their family members and friends 
– to apply for large numbers for these facilities.”37
The first change in the law
Open deliberation of these risk-increasing factors and the messages 
emerging from the professional organizations played a role in the fact that, 
days before the announcement of the tender, “The tobacco law seems to (have 
been) softened. In addition to the earlier ideas it was suggested that not only 
cigarettes but also lottery tickets might be supplied by the tobacco shops. 
Members of parliament certainly perceived that traditional tobacco shops had 
been selling not only cigarettes and cigars but newspapers, sweets and toys, 
because selling tobacco products did not provide the owners with enough 
revenue. The independent proposal by ruling party MPs on 19 November 
2012, the aim of which was to modify Law CXXIV (2012), created an 
opportunity to expand the profile of the newly-established national tobacco 
shops. The lottery (or in a broader sense, gambling) became a component of 
supply.  As for the proposal of these MPs concerning tobacco shops, it was 
that “….regulated Lottery Gaming is tradable.”38 Parliament adopted these 
proposals on 11th December 2012.
36 http://index.hu/gazdasag/2013/04/25/stormanok_is_rarepultek_a_trafikbizniszre/
37 http://hvg.hu/gazdasag/20130620_500_trafik_egyetlen_kezben_trafikmutyi
38 http://www.parlament.hu/irom39/09165/09165.pdf
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The second modification of the law
One of the most important elements in the business plans and calculations 
was the potential margins of the saleable products. Professional organizations 
drew attention to the fact that “shops cannot be operated economically in 
the long run considering the 3-5 percent margin obtainable through the sale 
of tobacco products.”39 The most important message which was sent to 
producers and distributors was this: renounce some portion of your profit 
in favor of tobacco product salesmen: “up to now, the tobacco trade was 
only profitable for salesmen if producers paid them separate so-called sales 
and marketing incentive contributions. But by prohibiting this practice, as 
demanded by the insiders who sponsored the tobacco law of 2012, they put an 
end to this.”40 However, according to professional organizations of producers 
and wholesalers the further expansion of the tradable product range would 
ensure a balanced, profitable business for retailers of tobacco products. “It is 
essential for the creation of an operational tobacco-retail structure in the long 
run that the conditions for a truly secure income should be ensured for the 
winners of the concession tenders. One of the basic conditions for this would 
be providing them with a wide range of products that can be sold in national 
tobacco shops, and the secure and long term financing of these activities.”41
The government changed the regulation in favor of producers and 
wholesalers. Meanwhile, it asked these market players to exercise restraint. 
They were also informed at this time that regulatory power remained in the 
hands of the government. According to János Lázár “the government will 
not allow tobacco producers to force a too low margin on the national tobacco 
shops, therefore this issue will be regulated by law if it becomes necessary…
if the tobacco-lobby hopes that its spasmodic affection to low margins will 
hamstring the market position of retailers than I have to disappoint them: we 
have performed much harder tasks already”.42 
39 Ábrahám Ambrus – Batka Zoltán (2012)
40 Ábrahám Ambrus– Batka Zoltán (2012)
41 http://www.piacesprofit.hu/kkv_cegblog/kell-az-udito-es-a-lotto-a-nemzet-trafikjaiba/
42 http://nol.hu/gazdasag/belenyulhat_az_allam_a_dohany_arresebe
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The results of the first tender
The second change in the law (submitted on 12th February 2013) would also 
have been a factor in the fact that “the National Non-profit Tobacco Trade Ltd 
extended the date for submission of applications.”43 
Applicants were obliged to administer their modified applications within 
a few days but this did not change the outcome that the first tender was 
successful: “15633 applications arrived for the concession tender of tobacco 
shops. Four, five or more times as many subscriptions were applied for as 
concessions in the more frequented areas of the capital and in some counties 
– reported National Non-profit Tobacco Trade Ltd.”44
The third change in the law
The results of the tender (the list of 5415 winners) were made public 
on 23th April 2013. But the new concession owners had not yet received 
official notification when János Lázár submitted another proposal “on the 
modification of certain laws related to smoking.”45
The unexpected and unfavorable consequences of the tender inclined the 
government to modify the law again. Namely, in the absence of candidates no 
tobacco shops could open in a significant number of Hungarian settlements. 
“There are 1417 settlements in Hungary where nobody submitted an 
application.  Looking at the list it is striking that these are mainly small 
villages of 2000 inhabitants, or even smaller settlements. The yearly rental fee 
(for such as shop) would be altogether less than a hundred thousand forints 
but it seems that it isn’t worth it for locals to maintain a separate tobacco 
shop.”46
The third change in the law would facilitate legal trading in settlements 
which remained without tobacco sales outlets. If exercising the rights to 
tobacco retail ceases (or rather, is not awarded to a settlement), the Hungarian 
state may exercise the right to sell tobacco products to a limited company or 
a company-authorized individual until such time as a concession contract is 
43 http://vallalkozoi.negyed.hu/vnegyed/20130205-meghosszabbitottak-a-trafikpalyazatokat.html
44 http://privatbankar.hu/kkv/modositottak-a-torvenyt-igy-sokan-palyaztak-trafikra-255583
45 http://www.parlament.hu/irom39/10881/10881.pdf
46 http://index.hu/gazdasag/2013/03/29/1417_telepules_maradhat_dohanybolt_nelkul/
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signed, based on a successfully-awarded permit.”47And “It will be possible 
for the state to exercise the right to trade in tobacco products through the use 
of a mobile shop as well.”48
Another way to improve conditions for business was through the (proposed) 
raising of the up-to-four percent margin of these products: “the minimum 
trading margin rate is (would be) ten percent of the (gross) retail sale price of 
the tobacco products.”49
The third change rewrites the rules of competition among suppliers too. 
It eliminates the opportunity for so-called ‘slotting’ (or payment of ‘shelf 
money’). The owner-operator is prohibited from entering into any agreements, 
either directly or indirectly with the supplier; moreover suppliers are 
prohibited from receiving accepting gifts, discounts, or other benefits from 
the relationship (excluding the usual-conventional trade margin), the aim of 
which is to facilitate the start up or practice of the tobacco retail trading”.50 
Moreover, “The provision of preferences or benefits for establishing, 
operating or installing tobacco shops is considered unlawful.”51
Tobacco scandal No. 1.: the main arguments of opponents
The result and method of the distribution of concessions was subject to an 
overwhelming nationwide response. The characteristic and typical objections 
of those who were dissatisfied with the outcome of the process included the 
following:
1. Dispossessed traditional tobacconists became common figures in the 
media during these weeks. There were numerous reports about the checkered 
fates or shutting down of tobacco shops that once belonged to successful 
tobacco shop owners; honorable members of local society.
2. That  persons inexperienced at trading tobacco commonly won concessions 
provoked opposition not only from tobacconists and their representatives but 
the wider public. According to our information, “the big multinational tobacco 
producers and distributors also reviewed the list of 5400 concession winners 
– presumably in search of potential business partners. They compared this list 
47 http://www.parlament.hu/irom39/10881/10881.pdf
48 http://www.parlament.hu/irom39/10881/10881.pdf
49 http://www.parlament.hu/irom39/10881/10881.pdf
50 http://www.parlament.hu/irom39/10881/10881.pdf
51 http://www.parlament.hu/irom39/10881/10881.pdf
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of names to their database of former clients (not only including tobacconists 
but also innkeepers). To the best of our knowledge they were able to identify 
only 800 of their former business contacts. This means that the vast majority 
of the concessions – namely, 4600 licenses – were received by persons who 
had not previously traded tobacco.”52
3. Opponents also complained that contributors and contact partners of any 
of the big players on the tobacco market won a surprisingly large number 
of concessions:  “From July more than 500 tobacco shops will be managed 
by persons who are connected somehow to the Continental Company at 
Hódmezővásárhely. Persons belonging to tobacco trading companies, 
the owners of which have or had - in the role of acting or silent partners - 
business connections with Continental Company or with its distributor Taban 
Trafik Limited, or other stakes of Continental, won nearly the same number 
of concessions.”53 Continental  informed those interested that “this process 
was managed only by our fellow workers, without any kind of ‘central 
involvement’, because in the last 8-10 years they had noticed in their daily 
work that they were regularly  sidelined from the market 
of tobacco products - thus their work and their livelihoods were at risk – as 
we have read in the communiqué. Namely, the company itself also believes 
that these people represented Continental’s interests in the competition for 
concessions.”54
4. We have identified several media stories which have covered the fact 
that the winners of tenders have a friendly-family or subordinate relationship 
with the local or national leaders of the governing party alliance or with state 
officials who are involved in the decision-making processes of local or central 
government.55 “For example, the 19 year old son of the mayor at Fonyód won 
3 concessions. Two of these tobacco shops will operate in Fonyód; another in 
Balatonfenyves. (The family relationship is revealed from the biography of 
the mayor and from the Open database too). There are other settlements where 
our local readers suspect that members of the mayor’s family are among the 
52 (B.Z.) 2013
53 http://hvg.hu/gazdasag/20130620_500_trafik_egyetlen_kezben_trafikmutyi
54 http://hvg.hu/gazdasag/20130522_Continental_dohanygyar_kozlemeny
55 The theory of regulation describes this phenomenon: “Occupational licensing. The licensing 
of occupations is a possible use of the political process to improve the economic circumstances 
of a group. The license is an effective barrier to entry because occupational practice without the 
license is a criminal offense. Since much occupational licensing is performed at the state level, 
the area provides an opportunity to search for the characteristics of an occupation which give it 
political power”. Stigler (1971) p. 13.
56 MIHÁLY LAKI
CORVINUS JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL POLICY  2 (2015) 
winners of such tenders. At Algyő, for example, Mrs Istvánné Herczeg won 
two of the town’s three tobacco shops. The name of the mayor is Mr. István 
Herczeg. Furthermore, the mayor of Izsák, Mr. József  Mondok, and deputy 
major Mr. István Zámbó at Kisvárda (delegated by FIDESZ) are among the 
winners.”56 
Members of the Government were associated with the list of winners as 
well. The prime minister’s involvement seems to be proved by the fact that 
some of his intimates won concessions. Károly Junek, the son-in-law of János 
Flier  who is the co-owner and tiller of eighty acres of land owned by Anikó 
Lévai  (the wife of prime minister Viktor Orbán) – won the concession for the 
only tobacco shop in Felcsút. The businessman who enjoys this monopoly in 
the village can sell his wares to visitors to events held at the Ferenc Puskás 
Football Academy which is managed by a foundation of Viktor Orbán’s. The 
son-in-law of Flier won a concession for a national tobacco shop in the next-
door village of Bicske as well.”57
The power-driven distribution of concessions is clearly observable in the 
case of the town of Szekszárd. One of the municipal representatives reported 
openly on how the concessions were distributed in the town. “It was not a 
formal meeting of the local council but it was some sort of policy coordination. 
The members of the (FIDESZ) fraction were present and the constituency 
chairman said that ‘here is the list of applicants for the tender’. He asked us 
to look at the list and select our acquaintances and select suitable candidates. 
I was surprised. It is known that there are lobbies but it was surprising that 
this happens so openly. I was forced to argue for an old and long-established 
retailer couple – that they should not be disadvantaged because they have no 
friendly connections. We practically reviewed the whole list. We assessed 
the names and we voiced our opinions about people we knew.”58 On the 
other hand, the mayor of Szekszárd said that he - as constituency chairman 
– had not seen any listings. Moreover, he could not have seen such a list 
because the tender was managed by National Non-profit Tobacco Trade Ltd. 
The mayor insisted on his own statements when the details of the process of 
the distribution of concessions (that he was managing) was confirmed in the 
records.”59 
56 http://index.hu/gazdasag/2013/04/23/a_nagy_nemzeti_dohanymutyi/
57 Ferenczi Krisztina (2013)
58 http://hvg.hu/itthon/20130430_trafikmutyi_Szekszard_fideszes_kepviselo
59 http://hvg.hu/itthon/20130509_trafik_Szekszard_Fidesz_hangfelvetel
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The Hungarian prime minister evaluated these stories as random events. 
“There are hundreds of leftists among the winners of the concessions” – 
said Orbán Viktor in an interview. The prime minister refused to admit that 
decisions were made according to political criteria. He argued that: “I am a 
gentle man, therefore this is not a threat, but I say that if we had wanted to 
enforce our political strength using such a concession tender system, not one 
person from the left would have won.”60
Those who invited entries to the competition argued similarly. The 
president of the National Non-profit Tobacco Trade Ltd said that “neither 
any constituency chairmen nor politicians were included in the decision 
making. We prepared these decisions in collaboration with ministry staff and 
the reading committee decided. They prepared ranking lists of applicants by 
settlement which were later approved by the Minister. We have created a 
closed system to manage the applications. No one could take the names out 
of the building.”61
The president of the company stated that the widespread outcry was provoked 
by the media activities of influential business circles who were liable to suffer 
from being financially damaged. “I would rather figure out whose interest 
it is to stimulate this political scandal. I think that serious, well-paid groups 
are handling this issue. There are a lot of people who lost their tenders and 
therefore are dissatisfied with the situation. This is understandable. However, 
when the law was complete it was absolutely clear that it was not in the interest 
of certain groups to stand up to the system in July. 90 percent of the market 
was controlled by multinational companies until now.  This 400 billion HUF 
yearly turnover will be in the hands of Hungarian families henceforth. This 
creates an enormous loss for the multinationals. The new system creates equal 
opportunities. The multinational companies – based on sponsorship money 
– have been able to take a considerable share of the market until now. Some 
companies have paid billions to trade their products exclusively in a certain 
store. Now they will have no chance to do that.”62
60 (B.Z.) 2013.
61 http://nol.hu/gazdasag/20130430-tizennegy_titkos_szakerto
62 http://nol.hu/gazdasag/20130430-tizennegy_titkos_szakerto
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Tobacco scandal No. 2.: Unexpected and unusual consequences
The organized action of the losers63 did not create any delay. ”Because 
of the present tobacco law, people who have lost their means of existence 
in part or entirely are trying to create a means of virtual and real interest 
representation after it has been proven that the institutions created for that 
purpose - due to their involvement – are completely unable to fulfill their 
tasks. Today, as a first step we have started a Facebook page….Our goal is to 
destroy the extremely corrupt results of the tender and/or to force those who 
are competent to withdraw the law due to their involvement which makes the 
tobacco retail into a state monopoly. In the interests of this, we shall consult 
all the national and EU bodies involved in the near future, and we will express 
our discontent on the streets as well.64
“People harmed by the regulation of the tobacco trade took to the streets on 
the 15th of March 2013. About 200-250 people gathered to listen to speakers 
who emphasized that they had taken to the streets to defend the interests of 
their own and others’ family businesses. Their aim was the annulment of 
the law. They emphasized that this demonstration was a party-independent 
event.”65
Opposition parties also criticized the handling and the consequences of the 
tender. “LMP66 is initiating action before the tribunal to judicially enforce 
the publication of the list of tender applicants - announced Pál Schiffer at a 
press conference on Tuesday. The independent MP said that they had asked 
National Non-profit Tobacco Trade Ltd on 18th of April for the whole set 
of documentation and the scores of the applications received. They got the 
answer from the NNTT boss Zsolt Gyulay on Monday that the chief manager 
was refusing to hand over the applications – he mentioned”.67
Another parliamentary party, Jobbik, initiated the setting up of an ad hoc 
63  Instead of a forced or a voluntary exit, economic actors may choose the option to protest or 
speak up:  “The firm’s customers or the organization’s members express their dissatisfaction 
directly to management or to some other authority to which management is subordinate or 
through general protest addressed to anyone who cares to listen: this is the voice option. As 
a result, management once again engages in a search for the causes and possible cures of 
customers’ and members’ dissatisfaction. Hirschman (1970) p 5.
64 http://www.nyugat.hu/tartalom/cikk/erdekkepviseletet_hoznak_letre_a_trafik_karosultak
65 http://www.nyugat.hu/tartalom/cikk/erdekkepviseletet_hoznak_letre_a_trafik_karosultak
66  LMP=Lehet Más a Politika (English: Politics Can be Different) is the name of a political party 
in Hungary.
67 http://www.galamuscsoport.hu/tartalom/cikk/209745
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Parliamentary Inquiry Commission to investigate the tobacco retail tender – 
announced György Szilágyi (MP)68 Activists from this party demonstrated in 
support of tobacco shop keepers at the party headquarters of FIDESZ.69
Many people sympathized with the losers. According to public opinion 
polls, the majority of the population rejected not only the results of the tender 
but its method of execution: “less than one-fifth of those surveyed agree 
with the tobacco tender of the government. The majority of them refuse to 
accept that the government has the right to decide who may trade cigarettes. 
According to nearly half of the Hungarians who were questioned, the winners 
were selected not in a professional way but through political connections/
networks-of-friends. Even a quarter of pro-Government voters suspected that 
there was corruption in the tendering process.”70
Further tenders
The Hungarian government and National Non-profit Tobacco Trade 
Ltd. perceived the increasing discontent of the public. A few days after the 
publication of the list of winners the regulation was modified again. On the 
one hand the government sought to increase the (according to a significant 
proportion of general public, unreasonably low) share of former tobacconists 
among the winners. On the other hand, the government and the limited 
company attempted to identify a solution to the problem that no one had 
applied for a concession in 1417 settlements so that consumers could not 
legally buy cigarettes in those areas.
The prime minister joined the opponents of his government on 2nd May 
2013: “’It is not acceptable that people would lose their livelihoods whose 
main job it was to manage a tobacco shop but who did not win a concession’ 
announced the prime minister in his interview on Friday. He informed the 
public that the government was looking for a legal opportunity that ensures 
that those shopkeepers who have been engaged in the tobacco product retail 
trade until now do not lose their livelihoods.”71
The responsible person from the government, János Lázár, announced a day 
68 http://index.hu/belfold/2013/04/27/trafik-ugy_a_jobbik_vizsgalobizottsagot_allitana_fel/
69 http://tablet.hvg.hu/itthon/20130510_Jobbikosok_tuntetnek_a_Fideszszekhaznal
70 http://www.atv.hu/belfold/20130508_a_magyarok_60_szazaleka_ervenytelenitene_a_
trafikpalyazatot
71 http://index.hu/gazdasag/2013/05/03/orban_is_megszolalt_trafikugyben/
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later that “a significant share of former tobacconists received a concession. 
A re-evaluation of tenders was offered to those who were not successful at 
this turn. According to the secretary of state, about one hundred tobacco retail 
shops are involved in the re-evaluation process which will be undertaken 
on a case-by-case basis.”72 An important codicil, however, was introduced: 
“in contrast to the original conditions…only those may apply who owned a 
tobacco shop which remains in the same location as it was in twenty years 
ago, and which obtains 80 percent of its revenues from tobacco products.”73
Another tender was announced on the 2nd May 2013, the aim of which was 
to solve the problem of unsupplied settlements. The sale of tobacco products 
was greatly facilitated in these small villages. “It was decided that tobacco 
retail trade could be carried on not only in tobacco stores but in other retail 
shops in settlements where the number of inhabitants is fewer than 2000, 
provided that these shops comply with the rules and other legal requirements 
concerning the sale of tobacco products. Such sales would be possible only 
in shops where a separate area may be created which facilitates the trade of 
tobacco products and which is not visible to young customers.”74 The results 
of the announced “corrective” tender of 3th of May 2013 were published on 
30th of August 2013.
Provisional and long-term market effects
The decline in the sale of tobacco products (observed since 2012) continued 
and moreover speeded up after the adaptation of Law CXXIV (2012) and 
its modifications. Compared to the previous year, turnover of these products 
dropped by about 25%  in 2013. Several experts had expected market 
disruptions and supply difficulties during the period of change in the market 
(i.e. in the months when the pre-existing shops were removed from the 
market and the new entrants came into play). But these pessimistic forecasts 
and estimates were not realized – no significant disruptions occurred to the 
market. Smokers had easy access to their desired cigarettes, cut tobacco and 
cigars without difficulty because “80 percent of the national tobacco shops 
opened on schedule, on the 1st of July.”75 The chance of a smooth transition 
72 http://www.nepszava.hu/articles/article.php?id=642778
73 http://www.blikk.hu/blikk_aktualis/igy-lehetetlen-trafikot-nyerni-2189961
74 http://nemzetidohany.hu/assets/Nyilvános-koncessziós-pályázati-kiírás_2013.05.02..pdf
75 http://index.hu/gazdasag/2013/05/29/cigaretta_nelkul_marad_az_orszag_juliustol/ and 
http://index.hu/gazdasag/2013/07/09/ultimatumot_kaptak_a_renitens_trafikosok/
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occurring increased because numerous smokers - counting on some temporary 
difficulty in obtaining their preferred smoking product - had thought to buy 
in greater than usual stocks. Turnover of tobacco products had increased by 
mid-2013, and more so in the second quarter of this year. But thereafter - 
mainly in the last months of the year - dramatic declines in monthly turnover 
took place (see Table 1). 
Unfortunately, this is not a sign of the desired reduction in smoking of 
members of Hungarian society but rather relates to an increase in the illegal 
trade of tobacco products which occurred after the opening of the national 
tobacco shops. According to a survey managed by GfK Hungaria76 in August-
September of 2013, “After experiencing a downward trend in recent years, 
last year was the first when - because of multiple increases in excise duty - the 
black market repeatedly grew over a relatively short period of time. The share 
of tobacco products of foreign origin was 4.2 percent in 2011 5.8 percent in 
2012 - and this year it increased to 7.7 percent.”77
The research company registered further increases in the illegal trade in the fall of 
2013. “The (market share of) illegal trade in tobacco products increased by 11 percent 
at the end of the previous year in Hungary, compared to the nearly 8 percent measured 
by the first survey done by the company in May-June.”78
According to the evaluations of the government the fact that only a temporary 
decline occurred (caused by the immediate conversion of the tobacco market) was 
awarded great significance. “It seems that the transitional period which started in 
July with the establishment of the national tobacco shops’ network is coming to an 
end, drawing conclusions from the latest data” said Deputy Secretary of State at the 
Ministry of National Economy, Zoltán Pankucsi. During the first days of October 
2013 he stated that the tobacco companies had paid excise tax amounting to HUF 24 
billion in August. This amount remained below last year’s otherwise outstanding sum. 
But much more money was collected for the budget in September. Revenue may reach 
35 billion HUF this month - said the ministry leader, who noted accordingly that the 
previously average level of revenue  was derived from the last months’ legal trading 
in cigarettes.79
76 Hungarian market research company, member of the international network of GkI 
see more: http://www.gfk.com/hu/Lapok/default.aspx
77 http://index.hu/gazdasag/2013/05/29/cigaretta_nelkul_marad_az_orszag_juliustol/
78 http://www.hirado.hu/2014/01/17/osszefogast-surgetnek-a-feketepiac-visszaszoritasaert-a-
dohanyipari-befektetok/
79 http://mno.hu/magyar_nemzet_gazdasagi_hirei/lecsaptak-az-illegalis-dohanyra-1188326
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Table 1 Free trade of products subject to excise duty (monthly data in 2013)
2013 Cigarettes, Cigarillos, Cigars (Million) All Tobacco (thousand kg)
January  717.04 355.68
February  804.39 431.02
March  917.34 452.52
April  992.93 439.08
May  926.37 447.13
June 1054.75 523.90
July  672.79 429.70
August  960.52 333.48
September  915.16 491.34
October  583.99 492.21
November  518.88 378.90
December  722.60 411.19
Source: National Tax and Customs Office (NAV)
But “normal conditions” were not restored in the coming months.  Based on 
preliminary data for October (2013) the tobacco excise tax revenue was estimated to 
be 18 billion for the month, which is about half of the September amount. Because of 
this trend, analysts at the Ministry reported a loss of HUF 26 billion which, together 
with the decrease in VAT revenue, means a loss of approximately HUF 40 billion 
from the yearly budget80.
Others - counting in illegally consumed tobacco - assumed an even higher share 
of black market turnover: “According to the president of the Hungarian National 
Association of Tobacco Growers81 harm to tobacco plantations is occurring more and 
more often in the region. Moreover, on several occasions a significant amount of leaf-
tobacco which was in the process of being dried was stolen.”82
Analysts explained the increase in illegal traffic by pointing to two factors: one is 
the required increase in the margin, while the other concerns changes in the sourcing 
strategy of smokers who have remained without legal purchasing options. For example, 
the “Ukrainian cigarettes ‘Feszt’ are much cheaper to purchase for 470 HUF than 
legitimate goods at twice the price. Cut tobacco is the cheapest of Furta’s products in 
tobacco shops.  A forty-gram package will cost 820 HUF. Of course there are a lot 
for whom that price is not affordable. So then they buy cut tobacco ‘second hand’.”83
The action of the government – another tender
The Government used administrative measures firstly to offset the unintended 
negative effects of regulation. The power of inspectors and the number of market 
80 http://www.napi.hu/magyar_gazdasag/zuhanas_cigarettafronton_meglepodott_a_
kormany.568816.html
81 Magyar Dohánytermelők Országos Szövetsége (Madosz)
82 http://www.piacesprofit.hu/kkv_cegblog/sokmilliardos-ongol-a-trafikrendszer
83 Kácsor Zsolt (2013)
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monitoring activities would increase, “therefore the ministry’s tax law proposal 
expands the possibility of checking those who are hunting illegal cigarette shipments. 
According to this proposal, the legislation would allow official persons to enter any 
premises and scan any buildings if they have reason to believe that unlicensed tobacco 
is hidden therein.”84
The third advertised tender (12th August 2013) of National Non-profit Tobacco 
Trade Ltd tried to ease the supply problems of 1500 settlements which were left 
without a tobacco shop. It read that ““tobacco retail is allowed not only in tobacco 
shops but in other shops in settlements where the permanent population does not 
exceed two thousand people if this business otherwise meets other legal requirements 
for the sale of tobacco products. Such sales may only be conducted in such shops in 
a separate, isolated space, or when a reserved section of a room can be created which 
will permit the sale of tobacco products…separately.”85
Tobacco producers and wholesalers in the new system
Meanwhile, new details have come to light concerning the real or perceived political 
ties of the new tobacco shop owners and their relationships to the large suppliers. The 
Hungarian government has not denied but only interpreted such news. According to 
the state Secretary at the Prime Minister’s office, one of the important players in the 
market is behind the newspaper articles which criticized the distribution of concessions: 
“They were lobbying in Brussels first, then the adoption of the law tried to stem this…
and at last they tried to take action to discredit [the law]” – claimed János Lázár 
about the multinational tobacco producer company Philip Morris Ltd. According to 
him, the opposition media were unable to identify Fidesz ties to 90 percent of the 
winning bids. Mr. Lázár was convinced that the regulatory changes caused a serious 
conflict of interest at Philip Morris. “They sent a clear message to us that they would 
do everything to prevent the introduction of the new system on July 1st. At a company 
of such a size, it is a matter of a few hundreds of millions to finance a communication 
campaign” - he added. The owner-manager of Continental Company used similar 
arguments. “Companies - the interests of which were damaged - consciously helped 
these newspapers. It is in someone’s interest to constantly damage the reputation of 
Continental.”86
Competition between the major tobacco suppliers (partly employing political 
means) sharpened. This development was connected to the fact that these companies 
tried to maintain or increase their market shares in a constantly shrinking market due 
84 http://tablet.mno.hu/magyar_nemzet_gazdasagi_hirei/lecsaptak-az-illegalis-
dohanyra-1188326
85 http://nemzetidohany.hu/assets/Kiírás_3.-pályázati-kör_teljes_2013.08.12.pdf
86 http://www.168ora.hu/itthon/dohanykoncesszio-continental-trafikbotrany-santa-
janos-114374.html
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to the rapid spread of illegal trading. The deteriorating market situation reduced the 
performance of these companies as early on as 2012. “BAT Ltd. suffered in 2010 
1.9 billion, in 2011 3 billion and in 2012 4.2 billion HUF losses in Hungary”, while 
according to the court of public data losses to the tobacco industry in 2010 were 5.3 
billion, and in 2011 8.6 billion HUF – as can be read in the communiqué of the tobacco 
company. Moreover “performance measured as profit before tax was not outstanding 
at these companies either. At Philip Morris profit dropped from nearly 1 billion HUF to 
756 million in this period also, the performance of the Hungarian-owned Continental 
weakened in 2012. Its net sales increased by HUF 19.1 billion to 23.4 billion but other 
expenses increased from 12 to 15.8 billion (because of excise duty), and the final 
operating profit was reduced to less than 200 million. The company’s pre-tax profit 
was 165 million HUF, the balance sheet said 122 million and the company did not pay 
dividends.”87
In such a market situation it was particularly important to the large suppliers what 
proportions of their products were located on the shelves of the national tobacco 
shops. As we mentioned before, the April 2013 amendment of the law banned the 
payment of so-called shelf money. It prohibited the drawing up of exclusive contracts 
and also outlawed other discounts. These changes of regulation did not equally affect 
market players. The owner-manager of Continental made no secret of the fact that 
the new legislation was favorable to them. “Of course the multinationals do not want 
to introduce the new system. Because they have paid a lot of shelf money for years. 
They bought the retailers ‘by weight’ so that they would sell their products only, and 
that the products of ours - or of other small and large manufacturers - were not on 
retailer’s shelves. It is very difficult to sell a product that the consumer does not meet 
with. In 1996, when we started our business many stores sold our products. Then 
the multinationals – based on various marketing contracts – ‘bought out’ the shops 
and did not invite us to join in their so-called ‘shelf-negotiations’. The tobacco law 
eliminated the competitive disadvantage of the smaller tobacco companies. That 
prohibits all marketing activities, including the shelf money which they employed to 
gain unfair advantages and displace domestic producers. It would be a great pleasure 
for me if everyone - Hungarian producers, Hungarian employers - helped each other in 
Hungary, and not just foreign capitalists, who are here only to hinder production and 
take out money. Although this is not the primary purpose of the law, this consideration 
should be one of the subjects for its opponents too.”88
The first months of 2014
Hungary experienced further a contraction in traffic and the expansion of the black 
market at the end of 2013 and in the first quarter of 2014 as well. This adversely affected 
87 http://index.hu/gazdasag/2013/06/04/gyengultek_a_dohanycegek/
88 http://www.delmagyar.hu/hodmezovasarhely_hirek/a_continental_a_
trafikpalyazatrol_/2331157/
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the new national tobacco shops’ performance. The chief manager of the National Non-
profit Tobacco Trade Ltd acknowledged in November of 2013 that “According to our 
accounts, 200 tobacco shops from the 6300 which operate in hypermarkets, malls and 
petrol stations obtained 17 per cent of market turnover. In contrast, 2500 tobacco shops 
are fighting for survival.”89 At the end of December 2013 they stated that “recalling the 
miserable traffic-related data, the government report acknowledges that a significant 
number of national tobacco shops face operating difficulties. Their revenues fall short 
or barely reach the level of sustainability.”90
The government’s response to this unplanned phenomenon was a further change in 
the regulation. “The director of the National Non-profit Tobacco Trade Ltd justified 
the governmental modification decree of the licensing procedure through referring to 
the disproportionate differences in traffic.91 According to the Government Regulation 
published on November 28, 2013 “A tobacco shop may not be established or related 
to buildings in which operate a.) Shops (commercial units) of more than 2,500 m2 of 
floor space b.) service stations and commercial units which serve the station. Tobacco 
shops may also not be established in shopping arcades.”92 Using everyday language 
this means that “national tobacco shops can operate only until 30 May 2014 in 
supermarkets with more than 2,500 square meters of space, at hypermarkets and petrol 
stations.”93 Furthermore: “According to the Regulation, until 30 May 2014 tobacco 
shops are not allowed to operate in parking lots and parks around these sites, including 
those which otherwise had received permission from customs and are currently 
operating.”94 The government’s decree was aimed at consolidating the tobacco product 
market and further declared that “after 30 May 2014 a tobacco shop cannot operate 
within 200 meters of any entrance to another tobacco shop.”95 Concerning the effects 
of these changes of market regulation we may share some estimations with the reader: 
“The government’s decree works against TESCO most, because it would affect 116 
tobacco shops operated in hypermarkets owned by the supermarket chain. Auchan 
has 19 and Interspar 31. CBA, however, has only three such stores.”96 The big oil 
companies which manage petrol station networks may be among the losers of the new 
rules as well.
89 http://hvg.hu/gazdasag/20131129_Tul_sokat_kaszaltak_ezert_teszik_ki_a_tra
90 Danó – Batka (2013)
91 ht tp: / /pr ivatbankar.hu/kkv/ezer t -nem-lehetnek- traf ikok-a-plazakban-es-a-
benzinkutakon-263618
92 A Kormány 453/2013. (XI. 28.) Korm. rendelete a dohánytermék-kiskereskedelemmel 
összefüggő egyes kormányrendeletek módosításáról
93  
94 http://hvg.hu/gazdasag/20131128_Kirugjak_a_trafikokat_a_benzinkutakrol_es
95  A Kormány 453/2013. (XI. 28.) Korm. rendelete a dohánytermék-kiskereskedelemmel 
összefüggő egyes kormányrendeletek módosításáról
96 http://index.hu/gazdasag/2013/12/11/trafikszabalyozas_a_tescora/
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Analysis and conclusions
We have described in our article how in the case of Law CXXIV (2012) that any 
unexpected, increasing negative impacts of smoking did not justify the diligence of 
the regulator. There was no dramatic deterioration in Hungary as concerns smoking 
habits, nor significant rises in the proportion of smokers. The Hungarian tobacco 
market was not characterized by severe market disruptions, nor supply difficulties 
before the implementation of this law. Moreover, the tobacco excise revenues in the 
budget were not dramatically lower by 2012. We have documented how illegal traffic 
did not significantly increase during the same period. No evidence of a regulatory 
deficit was found because Hungarian legislation had tightened up the conditions for 
the sale of tobacco products less than a year earlier.
Why the new law was needed? 
One of the reasons for the birth of the law should have been the expected policy 
benefits.97 It is no coincidence that the rollback and control of smoking was the most 
important aim (as declared) of the introduction and adoption of the law. The number 
of shops and purchase points which legally sold tobacco was radically reduced after 
the adoption of the law. The state authorities improved the efficiency of the monitoring 
system, increased the number of checks and the magnitude of penalties. This is why 
legislators and the government gained the recognition of domestic and international 
anti-smoking organizations and media employees.98
The goal of improving Hungarian entrepreneurs’ and the domestic middle class’ 
socio-economic situation also often featured among the declared intentions of 
legislators during parliamentary debates. This goal was partially met because a 
significant number of sales points ceased to exist in foreign-owned business centers 
and hypermarkets stores of gas stations. Accordingly, after the law came into force 
the likelihood of Hungarian small entrepreneurs engaging in tobacco retailing was 
probably increased.
Important but hidden goals were also accomplished. A significant number 
of interviews, personal communication and press-matter documented that local 
authorities were often involved in the process of allocating concessions. Not only 
97  “The government itself now has powerful political incentives to broaden membership among 
the privileged. Governments will be sorely tempted to offer still more licenses to practice law 
or medicine or to operate liquor stores, taxicabs, and barber shops. Such rents, of course, are 
not manna from the heavens; they must be supplied by political decision makers. The goals 
of these political actors may be pursuit of the public interest, or at least their own version of 
it. The task of the government is to devise politically optimal restrictions and entitlements 
that effectively limit market competition yet maintain the ruler’s own power and revenues. 
Michel-Munger (1991), page 526. 
98 http://www.origo.hu/itthon/20131008-orban-dijat-kapott-a-dohanyzas-visszaszoritasaert.html
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were a large number of relatives, friends and party sympathizers on the winners list, 
implying a policy-driven distribution process, but the bargaining power and influence 
of stakeholders and their relational capital prevailed in the drafting and submission of 
the “tobacconist law” and its modifications. Large tobacco-supplying companies were 
involved at different intensities and at different levels of efficiency in the regulatory 
process, in influencing the state and in the mobilization of applicants. One of the 
important market players – using its political ties - took part from the beginning in the 
regulation and transformation of the domestic market for tobacco products. 
We may interpret the law as a test case of top-down restructuring of Hungary’s 
property and market structure. “According to the Prime Minister: matters like these - 
but of greater importance - will occur again in this election cycle and in the future and 
will provoke similar debates because we will manage similar market restructurings 
in this election cycle and in the future as well. If we think that within the law, and 
respecting European competition rules, we have a chance to support small and medium 
size entrepreneurs then we will intervene and reorganize things.”99
The legislative changes, proposals and government regulations listed in Table 2 
detail the bargaining between market participants and market regulators, about the 
not-completely-expected effects of the new legislation and about the efforts of the 
government to avoid or to alleviate market disruptions in the period 2012-2014 for the 
tobacco product market in Hungary.
99 http://index.hu/belfold/2013/05/30/orban_lesznek_meg_piacokat_atszervezo_lepeseink
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Table 2 Problems and modifications
Changing or 
modification of the 
rules 
unexpected  
phenomenon which 
caused the change 
Change or 
modification 
Consequences and 
effects 
First amendment of 
the law 
12 December 2012 
Number of applicants 
is fewer than expected 
Expansion of the range 
of authorized products: 
namely, lottery 
More intensive 
recruitment 
Second amendment to 
the law, 12. February 
2013 
Few applicants from 
small villages 
Further extension of 
authorized product 
range  to include 
alcoholic beverages, 
coffee, mineral water, 
soft drinks, magazines 
Provisional 
improvement of supply 
in villages 
Third amendment to 
the law, 12. February 
2013 
Less profit than 
expected 
No applicants from 
small settlements 
Diminished regulatory 
advantages of 
multinationals 
Increase of authorized 
margin 
Provisional trade in 
other shops
Prohibition of shelf 
charge 
Provisional 
improvement of supply 
in villages 
 Tender for pre-
existing tobacconists, 
3. May2013 
Social tensions
Tobacconist scandal 
Special tendering 
conditions 
Distribution of 60-70 
concessions 
Tender for non-served 
settlements,
12. August 2013 
Growing illegal trade 
in tobacco products 
Provisional trade in 
separate section of 
grocery stores 
Provisional 
improvement of supply 
in villages 
Government decision 
Growing illegal trade 
in tobacco products 
Mayor of a settlement 
may appoint a trader of 
tobacco products 
Provisional 
improvement of supply 
in villages 
Government decision 
28. November 2013 
Tensions caused 
by variations in 
profitability 
Prohibition of trade at 
petrol stations and in 
shopping malls 
 
200 meters distance 
required between 
tobacco shops 
Unmeasurable impact 
 
Turning back to the indicators of success (as specified by the government: 
namely, the reduction or stagnation in growth of the share of smokers and 
improvement of the market position of the Hungarian entrepreneurial strata) 
we should mention here that these indicators are inappropriate for measuring 
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the – mainly negative – outcomes or costs of the law and its amendments. 
Due to the prohibitive limits on supply, several (mainly tobacco-selling) 
shops ceased to exist. The loss of income from tobacco weakened the market 
position (and the probability of survival) of a significant number of other small 
shops and restaurants. Among the negative effects we also should mention 
that the increase in the illegal trade of tobacco products generated losses 
at the newly-established national tobacco shops as well.  Another negative 
and unexpected impact of the new regulation (more exactly, of the growing 
share of illegal trade) is the less-than-planned budget revenue. These are the 
negative effects and unplanned losses stemming from the implementation of 
Law CXXIV (2012). 
It has also been demonstrated in this paper that several of those regulated – 
losers and winners alike – did not remain inactive. They forced the regulator 
(the state) to redistribute profits and losses and successfully pressed state 
authorities and parliament to repeatedly ‘correct’ this piece of legislation. 
The ongoing process of re-regulation was associated with disturbances and 
unplanned side effects which did not arise from those who had left or been 
displaced from the market. These persons, companies or their representatives 
did not have significant bargaining power. They used the spectacular and 
noisy instruments of exit and voice but only small groups took part in unusual 
and provocative actions. A significant fraction of the losers of the new 
regulation partly or totally counterbalanced their losses caused by crowding-
out. They sold a greater number of products or services which were not 
affected negatively by the new regulations. 
It was not only the government’s ongoing re-regulation but their protection 
of big companies and newly-selected players on the market (the winners of 
concessions or those who bought concessions on the secondary market) that 
contributed to the recurrent regulatory failures. A significant number of actors 
entered the market on the basis of unfounded and overly optimistic business 
plans. They often did not take into account the likely shrinkage of the market 
and they underestimated the speed of the expansion of black market turnover. 
Moreover, they did not assess carefully the impact of the spatial location of 
their shops on turnover. We have documented how these disgruntled and 
disappointed new players often indicated their dissatisfaction to the regulative 
state via protest and exodus.  
Not to minimize the importance of these factors, we are nonetheless 
convinced that the main source of market disturbances was the fact that 
the state - following its hidden political goals – repeatedly rearranged and 
reorganized the market for tobacco products. Table 2 shows clearly that the 
regulatory failures and miscalculations (one and a half thousand settlements 
70 MIHÁLY LAKI
CORVINUS JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL POLICY  2 (2015) 
without points for making tobacco sales, the lower-than-expected number of 
applicants, the greater-than-expected number of loss-making new businesses) 
forced the initiation of the rapid feedback and continuous correction processes 
that were managed by the regulatory state or by National Non-profit Tobacco 
Trade Ltd. Avoiding expected political losses was the reason for state 
regulators to extend the range of goods and services available at national 
tobacco shops and why they eased the separation concerning the trade in 
tobacco products. This explains why regulators empowered the mayors of 
smaller settlements to appoint local tobacco product traders. 
These are the reasons for the various modifications of the regulation. These 
are the reasons why the impatient regulator was unable to wait for regulated 
market players to adapt. The adjustments, however, caused new regulatory 
disturbances and tensions and led to further regulatory amendments. The story 
is not yet over. We do not know whether the regulatory state has learned from 
the process. Will it start on further experiments with nationalizing markets? If 
so, how will its combat strategy change?
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